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A model of Senegalese FSWs
Revised August 22, 2017
Seiro Ito*2
Abstract Sex workers supply sex acts out of bare necessity for survival. They are often stigma-
tised of their profession and worry about being known to others. Eectiveness of registration
policies that intend to reduce harms of sexually transmitted infections may be reduced by such
stigma. To understand the responses of sex workers to a registration policy, we develop a model
of sex worker supply with stigma under a simple labour supply framework. We show that sex
workers with lower asset levels decide to register and they supply more sex acts. In the exten-
sion of the base model, we consider eects of other earning opportunity, STD infection risks
and their treatment possibilities, and presence of dierent client types (occasional and regular).
Results of the base model are shown to be maintained.
1 Introduction
Many countries have been banning prostitution on moral and public health grounds. Such ap-
proach is broadly considered as criminalisation of prostitution. Criminalisation is considered to be
less eective than policymakers intended, because a ban that criminalises oenders often does not
reduce the demand for it due to lux enforcement, while illegalisation pushes the sex industry to un-
derground that public health ocials cannot easily approach. It is thus natural that harm reduction
and more controled approach to prostitution is widely discussed both in policy and academic arena
(Rekart, 2005).
Harm reduction imposes regulations and provide assistance to minimise harms (Ritter and
Cameron, 2006). It is often proven to be eective to curve HIV infection under an injection drug
user (IDU) context focused on needle syringe programs (Cook et al., 2016). Under the sex work
context, it involves regulations on sex work and assistance to sex workers. To keep activities under
the regulatory purview, it is essentially coupled with partial decriminalisation. In Senegal, brothels
are illegal and criminalised. While decriminalisation does not penalise sex workers who comforms
with medical checks and carrying cards, it does criminalise brothel owners/managers. Consequently,
sex workers who intend to supply many sex acts need to solicit clients in more noticeable places.
There is a wide spectrum of regulations, from location, venues, hours, to registration and period-
ical testing of sexually transmitted diseases. Assistance includes free distribution of condoms, free
medical and psychological counselling, and access to free medical care. There is, however, little
research that indicates how the sex work will be aected by regulatory and assistance policies.
In this paper, we use Senegal as an example and model how a decriminalisation policy may aect
the sex work supply. Senegal is a predominantly muslim country that decriminalised sex work in
the 1960’s and keeps the HIV prevalence rate to the second lowest level in Africa. The base of
policy is registration: A sex worker must register at a public health facility to be issued a card, and
is required to visit a clinic every month to check health conditions. If one fails to carry a valid card
when soliciting a client, one faces a risk of an arrest and may be sentenced to a fine or a prison term.
Not all the sex workers decide to register. There is a strong fear and stigma among the sex workers
about being known by family members and friends about their sex work. The card is easily noticed
by others about the sex work, and all sex workers show unwillingness to carry a card.
There are two types of location: Public and private. Public places include bars, clubs, and streets.
Private places are mostly residences. Arguablly, in the public places, market size is bigger and
*2 Development Studies Center, IDE, Chiba, Japan. I would like to thank Aure´lia Le´pine, Carole Treibich for their
comments on the earlier draft and their generousity to share the survey data from Senegal. I would also like to thank
partiticipants at the IDE Workshop on Trade and Development, 2017, for their comments. I would like to thank Akiko
Sasaki, Hiroshi Fukai, and Junko Shimazoe for their administrative supports. All the remaining errors are mine.
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clients are a mix of occasional and regulars. In contrast, in private places, market size is almost fixed
and more regular clients are found. Sex workers in the private places often choose not to register,
because they are less likely to be spotted by police and they have a higher risk of being seen by
family members and friends. Sex workers in public places tend to register because they are more
visible and easily noticed by police.
In the following sections, we will model the sex act supply in the spirit of traditional labour supply
framework. We will show that low income induces sex workers to register, and take more clients.
2 A model
2.1 Facts and modeling ideas
In the descriptive statistics section of the companion paper (Ito et al., 2017), we have seen that
the registered FSWs dier from nonregistered FSWs in the following aspects: Work at more visible
location, take more clients, take more occasional clients, earn larger incomes, take more risks, and
feel more stigmatised. In addition, Figure 1 shows that they are less educated, less likely to live with
children or other family members. From these, we can see that one of the advantages of registration
is a bigger market size. In fact, as in Table A1 in the below shows, nonregistered FSWs charge a
higher prices on average to both occasional and regular clients, yet earn less incomes from them
than registered FSWs (Figure 2). This suggests that they supply less amount of sex acts. We take
this empirical regularity in our data to conjecture that registered FSWs are more in need of earning
cash incomes, and they enjoy a smaller repercussion of their supply behaviour on prices in a big
market rather than facing a downward sloping demand curve in a small market. We also note that
the clients do not ask to show the registration card, so FSW registration status does not directly
aect the terms of sex act transactions once the clients and FSWs started negotiation. Indeed, unlike
Edlund and Korn (2002); Immordino and Russo (2015), we do not model the demand side or any
strategic interactions to keep the model tractable. This is also in line with the facts that our focus
on the decision making process of FSWs, not the market equilibria, and that our data only provide
information of clients but not the potential clients which are necessary to empirically analyse client’s
self-selection process.
Table 1: Mean prices charged, by registration status and client type (tail 5% are trimmed)
type min 25% median 75% max mean std n
registered, occasional 3500 6000 10000 17500 35000 12550:7 7559:2 227
registered, regular 4000 7000 12500 20000 45000 14787:5 9869:8 240
not registered, occasional 3500 7500 12500 17500 40000 14187:5 8702:7 168
not registered, regular 4000 7625 13125 20000 57500 16458:7 11154:6 266
Note: An occasional client refers to clients that came once or a few times but someone you don’t
know or you wouldn’t recognize the face. A regular client is all other clients.
Source: Summarised from data collected by Le´pine and Treibich.
2.2 A setup
A FSW is endowed with an asset A 2 R, lives with n children, and faces a unit price w > 0 for a
sex act. We assume that n is exogenously given. She chooses the number of acts a to maximise her
utility. There is a probability Pr[k = 1] = D 2 (0; 1) of being known by someone close that she is
working as a FSW, an event denoted as k = 1. This probability is assumed to be increasing in both
a and n, and further assume that it is dierentiable up to second order and the cross derivative is
nonnegative. She feels stigma g = g(A); g0 > 0 of working as a FSW once she is found by someone
close. We assume that stigma is increasing in the asset level A based on the presumption that, the
wealthier one gets, the more worried of the bad reputations stemming from engaging in a commercial
sex work, or A is positively related to social class. So this may also be termed as extrinsic stigma, as
2
010
20
30
Sw
a
zi
la
nd
Le
so
th
o
Bo
ts
wa
n
a
So
ut
h 
Af
ric
a
Zi
m
ba
bw
e
N
am
ib
ia
Za
m
bi
a
M
oz
am
bi
qu
e
M
al
aw
i
Ug
an
da
Ke
ny
a
Eq
ua
to
ria
l G
ui
ne
a
Ta
n
za
n
ia
Ca
m
er
oo
n
G
ab
on
CA
R
Co
te
 d
Ivo
ire
N
ig
er
ia
R
wa
n
da
So
ut
h 
Su
da
n
To
go
An
go
la
Ch
ad
G
am
bi
a
G
ha
na
G
ui
ne
a
M
al
i
Si
er
ra
 L
eo
ne
Be
ni
n
Li
be
ria
Bu
ru
n
di
Ca
pe
 V
e
rd
e
M
au
rit
iu
s
Bu
rk
in
a 
Fa
so
D
R
C
Er
itr
ea
M
au
rit
an
ia
N
ig
er
Se
ne
ga
l
M
ad
ag
as
ca
r
country
pe
rc
en
t
adult prevalence rate
Source: Data from UNAIDS 1990-2015.
Figure 1 Adult HIV prevalence rate estimates
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Figure 2 FSW earning by registration status and age
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we call it so later.*3 We also assume:
u0(c) > 0; u00(c) 6 0 8c 2 R++:
Her utility is given by
U = u(c)   D(ajn)g(A):
So her problem is
max
fag
u(c)   D(ajn)g(A)
s.t. wa + A = c
(p0)
Assuming an interior solution, FOC is:
F  u0

waD + A

w   D0(aDjn)g(A) = 0: (1)
We assume the second order condition for a maximum is satisfied.*4 This relationship in (1) is
depicted in the Figure 3 as an intersection e1 between u0 and 
D0g
w¯ . She chooses a to equate the
increase in marginal consumptive utility and the increase in expected marginal costs of stigma. The
value of realised utility U1 is depicted in the lower half of the figure, and it reaches its maximum
at a1. It can be argued, and we will assume so hereafter, that registration D = 1 as a FSW at
the government increases the probability of being known from 0(ajn) to 1(ajn) for all a and n,
1(ajn) > 0(ajn). Because g(A) > 0, the optimal acts a1 decreases from a0 and, as long as
0(a0jn) 6 1(a1jn), so does the maximised utility from V0 = u(wa0 + A)   0(a0jn)g(A) to
V1 = u(wa1 + A)   1(a1jn)g(A), so she will not register.
Let us consider the eects of A and n. We can show that daD=dA 6 0; daD=dn 6 0.*5 A
represents an asset to be consumed. But this also captures the consumption needs by other family
members, or some form of tax on sex work earnings. When a FSW has more number of dependents,
then we can express it as a low value or as a negative value of A which limits the consumption for
oneself. In a way, A also represents the preferences which considers other member’s consumption
as if one’s own.*6 A negative A can also be considered as a lump sum tax on FSW earnings. A also
works to magnify the fear of being known.
2.3 Registration
It takes some penalty of nonregistered status D = 0 or benefits of registered status D = 1 to
induce registration given the increased chance 1 > 0 of being known under registration than non-
registration. Registration can bring three benefits: First, one can access a bigger market to take more
*3 We can allow stigma to be nonzero even when not being found out. I normalise this baseline stigma level to zero
for simplicity. We can also allow for stigma to be variable with a by letting b1a + b2Ak. It does not change results
qualitatively. I set b1 = 0 for simplicity.
*4
u00w2   D00g(A) < 0 at a = aD
The sucient condition for SOC D
00
> 0 is satisfied at small values of D for a commonly used density, such as
logistic distribution at D 6 1=2.
*5 By totally dierentiating FOC (1), we have
da
dA
=   u
00w   D0g0
u00w2   D00g 6 0;
da
dn
=
Dang
u00w2   D00g 6 0; if 
D00 > 0;
D
00
> 0 is implied in the second order condition as we assumed in *4.
*6 One can extend this to incorporate other-regarding preference by changing it to u(c; z) where u(; z) measures the
other-regarding utility and the budget is changed to wa + A = c + z.
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clients. This corresponds to the finding in our data that registered FSWs do not take clients in the
obscure corners of the town but in the public places such as streets, bars, clubs, and hotels. In some
respect, FOC in (1) is analogous to the textbook monopolist behaviour in which the monopolist
must take declining marginal revenues and increasing marginal costs into account. In our case, the
FSW must take declining marginal utility stemming from declining marginal revenue (and concave
utility), while contrasting it to the marginal costs of being known. We will follow the analogy of
price takers to contrast the registered status with the nonregistered, and assume w is fixed in the
registered FSW market. Second, she will be able to use the health care services at a lower cost.
This reflects the characteristics of the actual regime in place in Senegal and other countries which
adopt the harm reduction approach. Our data also confirms that registered FSWs acknowledge the
health care cost advantages. Third, registered FSWs will not be arrested by the police. Again, this
is another characteristics of the regime in place which is also given by the registered FSWs as the
benefits of registration. We will consider the first two aspects in the following.
Let us assume that under D = 0, one faces a smaller market such that w = w(a) with w0 < 0. On
the contrary, under D = 1, one becomes a price taker and w = w¯ for 8a 2 R+. Then, the Lagrangian
under D = 0 is
L0 = u(c)   0(a)g(A) + 0[w(a)a + A   c]
while under D = 1 is
L1 = u(c)   1(a)g(A) + 1[w¯a + A   c]
Assume the following:
Assumption 2.1 1.
w(0) = w¯
2.
1(0) = 0(0):
3.
0
0
(a) > 1
0
(a) 8a 2 R+:
1 is a normalisation assumption to make the comparison between two problems easier. One can
relax it and allow w(a) = w¯+ z for a; z > 0 small and maintain a1 > a0 in the equlibrium, which may
be more consistent with our data. 2 is another normalisation assumption which may be justified on
the ground that a zero sex act would not reveal anything. Again, this can be relaxed and may not be
necessary for A small as they will choose aD > 0. 3 is a sucient condition for the nonregistered
status to induce a greater expected marginal stigma by a. This may be justified with a smooth density,
as there is a discrete jump from 0(a) to 1(a), it requires 0 to increase more rapidly than 1. Note
this holds if d2D=da2 = 0.*7
Assuming a > 0, FOCs are
L0c = u0   0 = 0; L0a =  0
0
(a)g + 0[w(a) + w0(a)a] = 0;
L1c = u0   1 = 0; L1a =  1
0
(a)g + 1[w¯] = 0:
*7 3 may look like a strong assumption but as 1(a) jumps more as a becomes positive, we have 1(a) > 0(a) for all
a 2 R+. Then we can expect 00 to be larger as 0(a) catches up on 1(a), or 10 (a) can stay lower than 00 (a). However,
it is a too strong assumption for our purpose because we only need 0
0  10 to be in pace with w0a, or
d
 
0
0
w+w0a   
10
w¯
!
da > 0.
In fact, our results hold if we assume w0 = w1 for  2 [0; 1] which holds if FSWs have to pay a part of wage to the
law enforcement to deter arrests.
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The Lagrange multipliers are given by
0 =
0
0
g
w(a) + w0(a)a
; 1 =
1
0
g
w¯
:
Denote the value function under D as VD(A). Then the slope of the value function is given by
D   Dg0 using the envelope theorem and, under the assumptions we have made, we know that
0 > 1 > 0 at all A 2 R. For a small A, we assume the following:
Assumption 2.2 For a small enough A, the following inequality holds:
V0(A) = u
n
w

a0

a0 + A
o
  0

a0

g(A) < u
n
w¯a1 + A
o
  1

a1

g(A) = V1(A):
Equivalently, this is to assume that stigma when being known by someone close g(A) is small enough
for a small A to satisfy the following inequality: An extra utility obtained by working in a bigger
market is larger than the increase in dierence of expected stigma of being known.*8n
1

a1

  0

a0
o
g(A) < u

w¯a1 + A

  u
n
w

a0

a0 + A
o
:
We note that n
1

a1

  0

a0
o
g(A) > 0
and
u

c1

  u

c0

> 0:
hence V1   V0 ? 0. So (2.2) assumes that, for a small A,
n
1

a1

  0

a0
o
g(A) is small and
u

c1

  u

c0

dominates. Then we can show that there exists A such that A < A implies V1(A) >
V0(A) so registration is superior.
The optimal a0 is given by the intersection e0 in the Figure 3. The optimal a1 under registration
is given by e1. In the left figure, V0(a0) > V1(a1) so nonregistration is optimal. The converse is
true for the right figure. The switch from D = 1 to D = 0 is induced by the increased level of A.
The realised utility is depicted in the lower panel of the Figure 3, and its value is maximised at aD.
Under the assumption 2.2, the maximal level of utility is greater for V0 under the large A case in the
left figure and V1 under the small A case in the right panel. In Figure 4, we show this dependency of
D on A which induces the heterogenous response in registration, explained by the relative positions
of the value functions V0(A);V1(A) over A.
One can also infer about the mental status of the registered FSWs relative to nonregistered FSWs.
As a increases under D = 1 and registration is accompanied with a jump in , the probability of being
known 1 increases both discretely and continuously from 0, hence the expected extrinsic stigma
1g increases for a given A. On average, the registered FSWs will feel more stigmatised despite their
larger earnings.
One can also incorporate intrinsic stigma deriving from the commercial sex act itself. This can be
distinct from the extrinsic stigma of being known as a FSW which is derived in an external, social
context. The intrinsic stigma may be argued to be more strongly rooted to the feeling of self esteem
than the extrinsic stigma. Let us continue to denote the extrinsic stigma as g and denote the intrinsic
stigma as  which we assume to be increasing 0(a) > 0 for all a. Then the utility is modified as
U = u(wa + A)   D(a)g(A)   (a):
*8 In other words, there exists a large enough  > 0 such that 1

a1

  0

a0

> , and/or small enough w > 0 such that
w¯a1   w

a0

a0 < w that allows the inequality in (2.2) to hold.
6
Figure 3 A large A case (left) and a small A case (right)
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This adds an extra marginal psychological cost to a thus decreases a relative to the case in which we
do not consider the intrinsic stigma. Upon registration, a increases and so does the intrinsic stigma.
We summarise these results in the following proposition:
Proposition 2.1 Under the assumptions 2.1, 2.2:
1. a1 > a0 for all A.
2. The decision to register D switches from 1 to 0 as A becomes large. That is, V1(A) > V0(A)
for A 6 A and V1(A) < V0(A) for A > A.
3. Expected extrinsic stigma is larger for registered FSWs relative to nonregistered FSWs, 1g >
7
0g for a given A.
4. Registration induces larger intrinsic stigma 

a1

> 

a0

.
We can include other fixed costs m of registration that is not related to number of acts (e.g., being
asked to report regularly) as another source of heterogeneity in D. The smaller the m, the later the
switch from D = 1 to D = 0 as A increases. As m can be dierent among FSWs, it introduces
heterogeneity in the registration decision. Formally, there can be two ways to modify the utility.
First is to subtract costs directly:
U = u(c)   D(a)g   mD; m > 0: (2)
Introduction of registration cost shifts the value function of registered FSW to shift vertically in
Figure 4. This does not aect aD.
The second way is:
U = u(c   mD)   D(a)g; m > 0: (3)
This shifts up u0 in Figure 3 for D = 1, so it increases a1. Despite the increased activity level, it
reduces the realised utility value so U1 shifts toward zero just as in the first modification in Figure 4.
In either way of cost considerations, V1(A) shifts toward zero. This induces the relatively poor
FSWs not to register as m becomes large. An increase in fixed costs of registration poses a problem
in controlling STI among FSWs as the fraction of registered FSW becomes smaller.
Let us consider a reduction of registration cost. First, we see that the utility cost of registration in
(2) does not aect aD for given D. However, it increases A which prompts some FSWs to register.
This increases a for the switched FSWs, hence the net eect on the total number of sex acts is
positive. Second, the reduced pecuniary costs in (3) have more nuanced impacts. Ir reduces a1 in
the intensive margin while also induces the marginal nonregistered FSWs to switch from D = 0 to
1. By switching, they increase a, so the extensive margin of sex acts of registered FSWs increases.
As a result, the combined eects on the total number of acts are ambiguous. In both cases, there will
be substitution of sex acts from the nonregistered to the registered.
Although we have not incorporated STI in the analysis, it is worth mentioning the impacts of
reduced registration costs on STI control. In (2), even if the sex act by registered FSWs is less risky,
the increased total sex acts can undermine the control on STI. In (3), it reduces the total nonregistered
sex acts which may be helpful in STI control, yet the change in total registered sex acts is ambiguous,
hence it is not certain if it helps to curve STI.
In terms of FSW welfare, the substitution in both cases should make the FSWs better o when we
do not consider the health damages of infection, because the reduction in costs should be beneficial
for existing registered FSWs and the switch to register is voluntary. If we consider the health dam-
ages, then the reduction in costs may harm the FSWs if it increases the chance of infection. Impacts
on health need to be considered in an extension that incorporates the health utility explicitly into the
analysis.
Proposition 2.2 Under the same set of assumptions:
1. Greater the cost of registration, lower the A.
2. When m is a utility cost, a reduced m:
a. Increases a1 in extensive margins.
b. Increases the total number of acts.
c. Increases average A and increased number of acts among the registered FSWs.
3. When m is a pecuniary cost, a reduced m:
a. Decreases a1 in the intensive margin yet increases in the extensive margin.
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b. Impacts on total number of acts are ambiguous.
c. Increases average A among the registered FSWs.
4. A reduced m induces substitution of sex acts from the nonregistered and registered.
3 Extensions
3.1 Other incomes
Let us consider that FSWs have an earning opportunity other than sex work. To do so, let us
redefine the sex acts in terms of hours used in sex work. Assume that an FSW is endowed with
one unit of time, and supply a fraction l 2 [0; 1] of time endowment to sex work. It will give sex
work earning of w(l)l with w0 > 0 for all l. The remaining fraction 1   l is used for other earning
opportunity whose earning is denoted by ih(1   l) with h0 > 0; h 6 0 for all l 2 [0; 1] and i 2 [; ¯]
is a positive valued, productivity term.
The maximisation problem is then:
max
flg
u(c)   D(l)g(A)
s.t. w(l)l + ih(1   l) + A = c
(p0)
Corresponding Lagrangian is
LD = u(c)   D(l)g(A) + D [w(l)l + ih(1   l) + A   c] :
Assuming l > 0, FOC is
F  u0   w0l + w   ih0   D0g(A) = 0: (4)
We assume the following:
Assumption 3.1
lim
l!0

w0(l)l + w(l)   ih0(1   l)	 > 0:
This ensures that the marginal pecuniary returns to sex act is positive at the limit, so everyone can
become a FSW when A and/or i is small. We further assume the SOC is satisfied.*9 We assume the
following inequality to hold for a small A, an assumption analogous to 2.2:
Assumption 3.2 For a small enough A, the following inequality holds:
V0(A) = u
n
w

l0

l0 + A + ih

1   l0
o
+ v0   0

l0

g(A)
< u
n
w¯l1 + A + ih

1   l1
o
  1

l1

g(A) = V1(A):
*9 At a = aD;
w00 6 0; h00 6 0; D
00
> 0;
hence
u00   w0l + w   ih02 + u0   w00l + 2w0 + ih00   D00g(A) < 0:
9
Note that Fl =SOC, FA = u00   D0g0 6 0, Fi = u00h   u0h0 6 0, so
dlD
di
=  Fi
Fl
6 0:
Using the Envelope theorem, we can see
dVD
di
=
dLD
di
= u0h > 0:
Given that u0(c1) 6 u0(c0) or c1 > c0 and l1 > l0, we see that
u0

c1

h

1   l1

< u0

c0

h

1   l0

;
so when i increases, the upward shift of value function is greater for V0 than V1 for a given A. This
reduces the relative merit of registration. This follows because a i increase will reduce A as the V0
shift is larger than the V1 shift. The consumption under nonregistration is smaller, hence the same
multiplicative increase on other earnings gives a larger impact on (indirect) utility.
With the same reason, for two FSWs i; j with i >  j and same A, we have lDi < l
D
j for D = 0; 1.
In addition, we can see that Ai < A j, so even with the same A, it is possible to have Di = 0 and
D j = 1. If we consider i as the human capital, the less educated who earns less in other activities
tends to register more.
Proposition 3.1 Under the assumptions 2.1, 2.3, 2.4:
1. With a given asset level A, greater the i, smaller the supply of sex acts l.
2. Greater the i, smaller the threshold asset level A.
3. FSWs with dierent marginal returns i >  j have the threshold asset levels Ai > A j for i , j.
3.2 Health
One natural extension of the base model is to incorporate health. Let us consider the health capital
h which gives the utility v(h0). We assume that a FSW is endowed with health capital of h0 > 0. For
simplicity of exposition, let us assume that health utility is linear in health*10 and write health utility
as v0 = v(h0), v1 = v(h1).
Through a sex acts, there is a probability (d = 1ja) = (a) 2 [0; 1] that she will be infected with
an STD, an event denoted as d = f0; 1g, with 0 > 0 for all a 2 R++. If infected, the health capital
will be reduced to v1 < v0. For simplicity, we assume that a FSW chooses a first and finds out the
infection status after completing a acts, rather than sequentially, confirming the status one act after
another. This is consistent with the situation where FSWs get checked up only occasionally, such as
once in a month as required under the Senegalese regulation regime.
We also assume the STD is a curable disease that the damaged health can be recovered if treated,
or a manageable disease like HIV/AIDS that may not aect the health condition severely if treated
according to a standard regimen. We therefore assume that the health capital recovers to v0 if
treated, with the cure rate  2 [0; 1].  measures the extent of treatment eectiveness. Denote
¯D(a) = 1 D(a); v¯ = v0 v1, then the expected health utility is given as Df(1 D)v1+Dv0g+¯Dv0 =
v0   Df(1   D)v¯ + D(1   )v1g. Her problem becomes:
max
fag
u(c) + v0   D(a) f(1   D)v¯ + D(1   )v1g   D(a)g(A)
s.t. wa + A = c
(p2)
*10 This can be relaxed at the cost of more tedious algebra.
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Corresponding Lagrangian is
LD = u(c) + v0   D(a) f(1   D)v¯ + D(1   )v1g   D(a)g(A)   D[wa + A   c]:
FOC is:
F  u0  (w0a + w)   D0  f(1   D)v¯ + D(1   )v1g   D0 (a)g(A) = 0
Again, we assume SOC to hold so Fa < 0. We can see that FA 6 0; F > 0; Fv¯ 6 0. Then
daD
dA
6 0;
daD
d
> 0;
daD
dv¯
6 0:
The second of these comparative static results shows the moral hazard induced by the treatment
possibility, and the third shows the negative response to an increased health loss. As in the previous
sections, we assume the following:
Assumption 3.3 For a small enough A, the following inequality holds:
V0(A) = u

c0

+ v0   0

a0

v¯   0

a0

g(A)
< u

c1

+
n
1   1

a1

(1   )
o
v0   1

a1

g(A) = V1(A)
This is to assume that  is close to 1 or v¯ is large. 2.5 is also more likely to hold if 0

a0

> 1

a1

at
large a0; a1, which holds if STI prevention is more eective with the registered FSWs. As A becomes
large and aD decreases, so does D

aD

which makes D

aD

terms to become ignorably small in
2.5, hence V1 < V0 results.
We can show
dV1
d
> 0;
dV0
dv¯
< 0;
dV1
dv¯
= 0;
hence both an increase in  and v¯ increase A. We also note that
0 =
0
0 
a0

v¯ + 0
0 
a0

g
w0a0 + w
; 1 =
1
0 
a1

(1   )v0 + 10

a1

g
w¯
;
and 0 > 1 is likely if 0
0
(a0) > 10(a1), (1   )v0 6 v¯ and 00 (a) > 10(a) in assumptions 2.1.
The first condition holds if the marginal infection prevention eort is no smaller for the registered
relative to the nonregistered FSWs: use of condoms, risk implications of venue and client choice,
risk implication of sex acts under intoxication, and choice of sex acts contents. This, however, is not
true in our data as we have observed in the descriptive statistic section that the registered FSWs tend
to engage in riskier acts more often, and we need to resort to other conditions for 0 > 1 to hold.
The second condition can be rewritten as v0 > v1, which states that the treatment cure rate  needs
to be no smaller than no treatment.
Proposition 3.2 Under the assumptions 2.1, 2.5:
1. If an increase in infection probability by each additional act is no larger for the registered, or
0
0
(a) > 1
0
(a), with minimal treatment eectiveness v0 > v1, a1 > a0.
2. Greater the cure rate , greater the a1.
3. Greater the damage v¯, smaller the a0.
4. An increase in  or v¯ increases A, hence delay the switch to D = 0 as A increases.
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1 implies that number of sex acts continues to be larger with registered FSWs, even if the treatment
is only minimally eective, as long as an additional act is equally risky between registered and
nonregistered FSWs. The statement holds if the marginal infection prevention eort is the same
between the registered and nonregistered FSWs. Since our data shows a1 > a0 holds in general,
which implies 0 > 1, one can conjecture that  in our data is relatively close to unity.
When the health checks and treatments regularly provided under registration is efective, an in-
creased activity level may not necessarily increase the remaining incidence, defined as incidence
after the registered FSWs have received a treatment, of STI at any given time. If the eectiveness of
treatment is suciently high, the increased activity level after registration can decrease the remain-
ing incidence of STI. This is what we find in our collected data. Together with a1 > a0 and the model
we constructed, we conjecture that the treatment is more than minimally eective ( relatively close
to unity).
2 predicts the moral hazard among the registered FSWs. Registered FSWs will increase a1 in
response to an increase in the cure rate . At the extreme of perfect cure rate  = 1, STI will not
aect the sex act supply and the supply behaviour will be reduced to our baseline case. 3 is a mirror
image response by nonregistered FSWs that the prospect of severer health damage reduces a0 when
the treatment is not available.
4 shows that the prospect of health damage and its treatment for registered FSWsmake registration
more attractive. The relative merit of treatment under registration is expected to induce FSWs to
register.
One notes that both the increased treatment eectiveness and increased damage size lead to in-
creased registration. Both of these induce substitution of sex acts from a0 to a1, which may be
beneficial for STI control. Eects on the total number of sex acts are dierent, however. An increase
in  increases total sex acts, while the increase in v¯ decreases it. These have implications on STI
incidence. If  increases, a1 in both extensive and intensive margins increase, thereby dampen the
impacts of improved treatment eectiveness. When v¯ increases, a1 decreases in intensive margin yet
increase in the extensive margin both under treatment provided by the government, thereby dampen-
ing the impacts of increased health damage. To see the impacts of relative merit more explicitly, we
will consider the dierences in the quality and costs of medical care between D status in the below.
Assume that the cure rate under D = 0 is  6  and there is a medical cost e > 0. Denote c0 as
consumption without treatment, c1 as consumption with treatment. Noting ¯fu(c0) + v0g + fu(c1) +
(1   D)v0 + Dv0g = u(c1) + ¯u(c0) + 1   f1    + D(   )g v0, the problem is:
max
fag
¯D(a)u(c0) + D(a)u(c1) +
h
1   D(a) f1    + D(   )g
i
v0   D(a)g
s.t. wa + A = c0
wa + A = c1 + (1   D)e
(p4)
This specification implies u¯0 = u

c00

  u

c01

> u

c10

  u

c11

= u

c10

  u

c10

= 0 = u¯1. As in the
previous sections, we assume the following:
Assumption 3.4 For a small enough A, the following inequality holds:
V0(A) = ¯0

a0

u

c00

+ 0

a0

u

c01

+
h
1   0

a0

(1   )
i
v0   0

a0

g(A)
< ¯1

a1

u

c10

+ 1

a1

u

c11

+
h
1   1

a1

(1   )
i
v0   1

a1

g(A) = V1(A)
cDd denotes the consumption under infection status d and registration status D.
This is likely to hold when  > , or when the expected consumptive utility is greater for the
registered at low A, E[u(c1)] > E[u(c0)].*11 Again, as A becomes large and aD decreases, so does
*11 This can be due to 0

a0

> 1

a1

in theory, but, in the case of our data, the greater risk taking among the registered
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D

aD

which makes D

aD

terms to become ignorably small in 2.5, hence V1 < V0 results.
Denoting u¯D = u(cD1 )   u(cD0 ), her FOC is:
F  D0
h
u¯D   f1    + D(   )g v0
i
  D0g +
n
Du0(c1) + ¯Du0(c0)
o
(w0a + w) = 0: (5)
We assume SOC for a maximum to hold. Note that F = 1
0
v0 > 0, we have da
1
d =   FFa > 0 as
before.
Given u¯0 > u¯1 = 0,  > , and assumptions 2.1, 2.6:
E u0jD = 0 = 00 nu¯0 + (1   )v0o + 00g
w0a + w
>
1
0
(1   )v0 + 10g
w¯
= E u0jD = 1 = u00jD = 1;
which requires 0
0
(a0) > 10 (a1) for suciency, which we assume to hold, although this inequality
is likely to hold without it given  > , u¯0 > 0 and w¯ > w0a + w. These show the condition for
a1 > a0. Then we see that c11 = c
1
0 > c
0
0 > c
0
1, so under a small asset A, D = 1 is preferred. Again, as
A increases, a decreases, D(a) approaches to zero, g(A) increases, and FSWs will eventually switch
to D = 0.
We can see that F = 0
0
v0 > 0, Fe = 0
0
u01   0u001 > 0 hence
da0
d
=  F
Fa
> 0;
da0
de
=  Fe
Fa
> 0;
so just as with the registered FSWs, treatment eectiveness induces more sex acts hence moral
hazard, and treatmet cost induces nonregistered FSWs to supply more sex acts to cover for possible
medical expenses.
To see the changes in treatment eectiveness on registration decision, we consider an infinitesimal
increase in  and . This shifts V0;V1 away from zero, and their shifts are given by
@V0
@
= 0

a0

v0;
@V1
@
= 1

a1

v0:
The relative extent of shifts depends on the relative infection probabilities 0

a0

; 1

a1

. Hence
a marginal improvement in treatment eectiveness leads to A to increase if 1

a1

> 0

a0

. One
also notes that this extent of shfits is not uniform across A or aD. As a lower A corresponds to a
larger aD, the shifts are larger for smaller A’s. This implies that the slopes of value functions flatten
as they shift upward in response to an increase in  and . This is likely to increase A.
Given the dierences in treatment eectiveness and its cost benefits under D = 1, it is possible a
FSW chooses to register yet works in a smaller market that is subject to a downward sloping demand
curve. Then her problem is:
max
fag
u(c) +
h
1   1(a) (1   )
i
v0   1;s(a)g
s.t. w(a)a + A = c
(p5)
FOC is:
F  u0  (w0a + w)   10 (1   ) v0   1;s0g = 0:
The corresponding Lagrangian multiplier 1;s, whose superscript indicates D = 1 yet works in a
small market, is
1;s =
1
0
(1   ) v0 + 1;s0g
w0a + w
:
FSWs shown in the descriptive statistics section suggests that it is more likely due to c10 > c
0
0 , c
1
1 > c
0
1 .
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Provided that 0
0
(a0) > 10(a1), we see 0;s = 
00 fu¯0+(1 )v0g+00g
w0a+w > 
1;s hence it increases a, or
a1;s > a0;s and V1;s(A) > V0;s(A), so nonregistration is strictly inferior if working in a small market
under the current setting. This implies that all FSWs choose to register, but that does not imply
that all FSWs work in a large, publicly visible market. This seemingly surprising result is a natural
consequence of the policy that subsidises sex acts and risk taking. This can be seen more explicitly
in the following inequality:
V1;s = u(c) +
h
1   1

a1;s

(1   )
i
v0   1;s

a1;s

g(A)
> ¯0

a0;s

u

c0;s0

+ 0

a0;s

u

c0;s1

+
h
1   0

a0;s

(1   )
i
v0   0

a0;s

g(A) = V0;s(A):
Given u(c) > E
h
u

c0;s
i
, this is likely to hold either one or all of the following hold:     is large,
0

a0;s

> 1

a1;s

, 0

a0;s

  1;s

a1;s

is nonnegative. If working in a small market allows us to
assume the detection probability 1;s = 0, as it happens when FSWs do not have to carry an obvious
ID card, then it is even more likely the inequality to hold. On the other hand, this inequality needs
to reconcile with the fact that there are nonregistered FSWs. One way to do so is to incorporate
registration costs m as we considered in the previous subsection.
So far, we have assumed that an STD-positive FSW will choose to get treated by spending e.
However, it is possible that they choose not to get treated if the resultant consumption c1 is small
enough to forgo the prospect of getting healthier. Denote the treatment as t = f0; 1g. Then her utility
is given by:
U(Ajd = 1; t = 1) = u

wa0 + A   e

+ v0   0

a0

g;
U(Ajd = 1; t = 0) = u

wa0 + A

+ v1   0

a0

g;
and when she makes such a choice, we must have:
U(Ajd = 1; t = 0)   U(Ajd = 1; t = 1) = u¯0   (v0   v1) > 0; (6)
with u¯0 = u

wa0 + A

  u

wa0 + A   e

> 0. (6) holds if e is large enough relative to wa + A that
makes u¯ large and/or  is small. This may hold if the medical services are costly or have limited
eectiveness in the area where nonregistered FSWs reside.
We note that the prospect of infection leaves a nonregistered FSW worse o in the ex ante sense,
before finding out the infection status, for two mutually exclusive reasons: Health disutility of in-
fection if left untreated and the uncertainty in consumptive utility if treated. Provided that there is a
probability that a STD-positive FSW does not get a treatment, the average physical health is worse
for nonregistered FSWs relative to the registered FSWs even if  = .
Proposition 3.3 Under the assumptions 2.1, 2.6:
1. If an increase in infection probability by each additional act is no larger for the registered, or
0
0
(a) > 1
0
(a), with a treatment eectiveness dierence  > , a1 > a0.
2. Greater the cure rate , greater the a0.
3. Greater the treatment expense e, greater the a0.
4. A marginal improvement in treatment eectiveness leads A to increase if 1

a1

> 0

a0

,
hence delays the switch to D = 0 as A increases. The contrary is true for 1

a1

6 0

a0

.
5. A nonregistered FSW may not choose to get treated for infection if u¯   (v0   v1) > 0, or
when the treatment cost e is large enough relative to wa + A that makes u¯ large and/or when
 is small.
6. Nonregistration is strictly inferior in the absence of registration costs.
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3.3 Client types
It is worth noting that a FSW has some control over the choice of clients. With a given price, it is
conceivable that not all the clients receive the same acceptance. This choice can be prompted by the
appearance or the knowledge of the client. Consider that there are two types of clients, occasional
o and regular r. An occasional client is typically a total stranger that the FSW does not have any
knowledge about. A regular client is an individual who shows up repeatedly, with an intention to be
matched with a specific FSW. We assume that the regular clients have a lower risk of carrying STD
virus, otherwise he will fall out of favour and will not retain his “a regular” status. In contrast, an
occasional client has an elevated level of infection risk. To be concrete, we assume that the aggregate
impact of sex acts with occasional and regular clients on (a`) is given by:
a` = ar + mao; m > 1;
where ar is the number of sex acts with the regular clients, ao is the total number of sex acts with the
occasional clients, and m is an elevated risk factor. Analogously, we also assume that an aggregate
impact on (a˜) as
a˜ = ar + m˜ao; m˜ > 1:
m˜ > 1 is justified in the following way. In the event of being known by someone close, regular clients
can be subtle in negotiating and reaching an agreement while occasional clients have to show, in an
understandable manner to at least one FSW, an intention that he is looking for a sex act. This makes
having an occasional client more visible to others about the commercial sex work. We assume that
a FSW cannot price discriminate between the occasional and regular clients, although this can be
relaxed at the cost of more tedious conditions.
Then her problem is
max
fao;arg
u(c) +
h
1   D(a) f1    + D(   )g
i
v0   D(a˜)g(A)
s.t. w(ar + ao)(ar + ao) + A = c
a` = ar + mao
a˜ = ar + m˜ao
ar 2 [0; a¯r]
(p6)
Corresponding Lagrangian is:
L = u(c) +
h
1   D(a) f1    + D(   )g
i
v0   D(a˜)g + [w(ar + ao)(ar + ao) + A   c] + [a¯r   ar]:
KT-FOCs are, assuming c; ar > 0, budget is used up:
Lar  (w0ar + w)   D
0 f1    + D(   )g v0   D0g(A)    = 0:
Lao  (w0ao + w)   mD
0 f1    + D(   )g v0   m˜D0g(A) 6 0; ao > 0; aoLao = 0:
Lc  u0    = 0:
L  wr(ar)ar + w(ar + ao)(ar + ao) + A   c = 0:
L  a¯r   ar > 0;  > 0; L = 0:
Denote the corresponding multiplier as  when ar < a¯r, and ˜ when the reserve of regulars is used
up ar = a¯r. Then, given w(ar)ar + w(ar) > w0(a¯r + ao)(a¯r + ao) + w(a¯r + ao) and  > 0,
(ar; 0jA) = 
D0 f1    + D(   )g v0 + D0g(A)
w0(ar)ar + w(ar)
<
D
0 f1    + D(   )g v0 + D0g(A) + 
w0(a¯r + ao)ao + w(a¯r + ao)
= ˜(a¯r; a0jA):
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Figure 5 Discontinuity in  and value function
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This indicates that the marginal cost curve jumps upward at a = a¯r. The choice of a is depicted in
Figure 5 for two FSWs, namely, a person with a small asset and a person with a large asset. A FSW
with a large enough asset will choose ar < a¯r, so the intersection is with , while a FSW with a small
asset finds it optimal to supply beyond a¯r hence ao > 0, thus the intersection is with ˜. When a FSW
takes occasional clients, we have
˜(a¯r; aojA) = m
D0 (ar + ao) f1    + D(   )g v0 + m˜D0 (ar + ˜ao)g(A)
w0(a¯r + ao)ao + w(a¯r + ao)
: (7)
When m = m˜, we have ˜(a¯r; a0) = m!(ar; 0) > (ar; 0) where ! =
w0(ar)ar+w(ar)
w0(a¯r+ao)ao+w(a¯r+ao) > 1.
*12
Assumption 3.5 For a small enough A, the following inequality holds:
V0(A) = u(c0) +
h
1   0(a`0)(1   )
i
v0   0(a˜)g(A)
< u(c1) +
h
1   1(a`1)(1   )
i
v0   1(a˜)g(A) = V1(A)
From the previous discussions that the optimal a can be written as a decreasing function of A,
one can show there is a threshold asset level A˜ that only FSWs with A < A˜ would take occasional
clients. Hence the poorer FSWs are more likely than the non-poor FSWs to take clients beyond a¯r
and accept o, despite the elevated level of infection and exposure risks. This means that the value
functions under D = 0; 1 show a jump at A˜D, because both D; D jump discretely upward once ao
becomes strictly positive. We can see that A˜1 6 A˜0 because the wage is smaller with D = 0 at the
optimum. If we continue to assume  > , then the jump is larger for V1 than V0.
Proposition 3.4 Under the assumptions 2.1, 3.1:
1. There is a threshold asset level A˜ such that a FSWwith A > A˜ only takes regular clients, given
the upperbound of the number a¯r of regular clients.
*12 It is possible that there is no intersection because  and ˜ are discontinuous at a = a¯r and u0 curve can pass through
the range of discontinuity. Should this be the case, the FSW chooses ar = a¯r ; a0 = 0 for all A that satisfy (a¯r ; 0jA) <
u0fw(a¯r)a¯r + Ag < ˜(a¯r ; 0jA) where ˜(a¯r ; ao jA) is given in (7).
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Figure 6 A variety of registration decisions
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2. There can be multiple switches due to the jumps created by a¯r.
In the last panel of Figure 6, a sex worker starts with being registered, switches to non-registered,
switch back to registered, and then end with non-registered as asset level rises.
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4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we modeled decision processes of a sex worker under a variety of conditions. We
consider sex act supply as risky labour supply. The foremost risk we consider is a risk of being
known by others that one is working as a sex worker. Sex act supply is determined while balancing
the marginal income gains against the marginal social costs of being known. Probability of being
known is greater if registered with the government. In the base model, we show poorer FSWs choose
to get registered and supply more sex acts. We also showed that there is a threshold asset level that
a FSW with a larger asset decides not to register.
In the extension of the base model, we considered eects of other earning opportunity, of STD
infection risks and their treatment possibilities, and of presence of dierent client types (occasional
and regular). The basic results of the base model are maitained and registration increases the number
of sex act supplies. Under the heterogeneity in client types, we derived that there can be multiple
asset level thresholds because a limited number of regular clients induces jumps in FSW value func-
tions.
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